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Toward an Anthropology of Computer-
Mediated, Algorithmic Forms of Sociality
by Eitan Wilf
This article argues that contemporary, computer-mediated, algorithmic forms of sociality problematize a long and
major tradition in cultural anthropology, which has appropriated the notion of artistic style to theorize culture as
a relatively distinct, coherent, and durable configuration of behavioral dispositions. The article’s ethnographic site
is a lab in a major institute of technology in the United States, in which computer scientists develop computerized
algorithms that are able to simulate the improvisation styles of past jazz masters and mix them with one another
to create new styles of improvisation. The article argues that the technology that allows the scientists to simulate
and mix styles is playing an increasingly important role in mediating contemporary forms of sociality over the
Internet and that the anthropological tradition that has theorized culture as artistic style has to be reconfigured to
account for the dynamic nature of these contemporary forms of sociality not as styles but as styles of styling styles.
“How Much ‘Miles’ Will You Have in Your
Cocktail?”
It was a warm, late August day, but inside the lab in a major
institute of technology in the United States, powerful air con-
ditioners maintained a cool atmosphere. I was still fiddling
with the video camera when James,1 one of the lab directors,
entered the room. He nodded to me quickly and then sat
down in front of the electric keyboard. Syrus, a humanoid
robot, was already situated behind the marimba, ready to play,
its four arms—each equipped with two mallets—placed in
different positions along the marimba. David, a member of
the research team, sat behind two computer monitors and
waited for James’s instructions. James turned to David and
said: “OK, let’s do “Yardbird Suite.” Syrus is going to play
the head, right?”2 David looked at James from behind the
monitors and said: “Yes. And at the end of the head you want
Syrus to trade fours with you?”3 James, playing some quick
phrases on the keyboard, said: “Yes, then trade fours. Does
Syrus have a certain amount of Monk, Coltrane, and—I think
Syrus has Monk, Coltrane, and You as third, third, third,
right?”4 “Yes,” David answered, looking at one of the moni-
tors. “But this looks like—because for this project it has a
‘You Slider,’ a ‘Charlie Parker Slider,’ and a—” “Parker, not
Coltrane?” James interrupted him with surprise. He looked
at Syrus for a few seconds and then said with a smile: “OK.
Eitan Wilf is Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in the Department of
Sociology and Anthropology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem
(Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel [ewilf@mscc.huji.ac.il]). This
paper was submitted 3 VI 12, accepted 10 II 13, and electronically
published 16 IX 13.
Let it be a third Parker—there can be nothing wrong with
having Parker in our mix, right?” Observing this conversation,
I agreed wholeheartedly, as did the three students who sat
next to me and who, like me, seemed to be curious to know
what a robot improvising in a statistical mix of the styles of
Miles Davis, Charlie Parker, John Coltrane, and the player
who happens to play with Syrus on the electric keyboard
sounds like. Just before Syrus and James began playing, the
student sitting next to me turned to his two friends and asked
with laughter, simulating a British accent: “How much ‘Miles’
will you have in your cocktail, sir?”
Syrus is a humanoid robot marimba player, which, thanks
to computerized algorithms, can be trained to imitate the
styles of different past jazz masters.5 As part of its training,
computerized algorithms perform statistical analysis on da-
tabases that consist of files of different masters’ solos. In actual
playing sessions, these algorithms instruct Syrus what to play
based on this analysis (Wilf 2013a, 2013b). During this specific
session in the lab, Syrus was programmed to improvise in a
style that is “a mix” of 33.3% the style of Miles Davis, 33.3%
the style of Charlie Parker, and 33.3% the style of the player
improvising with Syrus on the electric keyboard—in this case,
James—whose style Syrus can learn in real time because the
1. All names and locations have been changed to maintain anonymity of
research subjects.
2. “Yardbird Suite” is a jazz tune written by saxophonist Charlie Parker.
The “head” of a jazz tune is its melody. Typically, improvisations on a tune
begin after playing the head.
3. “Trading fours” is a practice in which different players improvise on a
tune a few measures each, one after the other, and in response to one another.
4. Monk is pianist Thelonious Monk (1917–1982); Coltrane is saxophonist
John Coltrane (1926–1967).
5. Specifically, the style imitation focuses on pitch and rhythm values.
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Figure 1. Sliders for controlling proportions of different styles. A color version of this photo appears in the online edition of Current
Anthropology.
electric keyboard is connected via a digital interface to the
computer that controls Syrus. As David’s comments make it
clear, it is possible to change the proportions of these different
styles in Syrus’s playing via sliders on the software interface
(“a You Slider, a Charlie Parker Slider”; see fig. 1). Thus, if
one wants “more Miles Davis” in Syrus’s improvisation, one
can manipulate the slider and achieve, for example, a mix of
70% the style of Miles Davis, 20% the style of Charlie Parker,
and 10% the style of the keyboard player improvising with
Syrus. As I will argue, the fantasies that motivate the research
in the lab in which I conducted fieldwork concern the pros-
pect of mixing the already too familiar styles of specific mu-
sicians with one another and thus creating new styles that will
reinspire listeners and players.6
6. My ethnographic fieldwork in this lab was part of a broader, multisited
research project on computer-mediated, algorithmic forms of creative agency
and sociality, which began in March 2011. I conducted preliminary fieldwork
in this specific lab in early May 2011, and then full-time fieldwork from
August through October 2011. During my fieldwork in the lab, I was given
a workstation next to the workstations of the other team members. The fact
that I am a semiprofessional jazz musician has eased my access into the lab.
It has also allowed me to conduct and video-record long playing sessions
with Syrus, in which I improvised with it on an electric keyboard in a call-
and-response fashion, and thus to gain a deeper understanding of its different
capabilities and of the overall research project.
Far from being limited to pockets of research in music
technology, parts of the technology that animates Syrus—in
particular, the computerized algorithms that simulate and mix
styles—have been a key mediator of sociality in late Western
modernity for quite some time, especially over the Internet.
Along with other computerized algorithms, they have enabled
search engines such as Google and social media companies
such as Facebook to statistically predict online users’ indi-
vidual preferences, tastes, and distastes—in short, their in-
dividual styles of various kinds—based on their online be-
havior, and then provide and produce online content that
mirrors and anticipates these styles. This enables companies
to produce more effective advertising strategies that bring to
users’ attention products they are more likely to buy (Cheney-
Lippold 2011; Seaver 2012). Computerized algorithms in con-
sumer-centered production derive their profitability from
their ability to tap into each consumer’s distinct patterns or
styles of consumer behavior, especially when this behavior
takes place online, because the online platform enables com-
panies to easily create large databases of consumers’ patterns
of online behavior. In both contexts—that of the jazz styles
Syrus learns and that of online advertisement strategies—
computerized algorithms identify behavior as a statistical pat-
tern that they can then anticipate and reproduce to achieve
This content downloaded from 128.195.74.65 on Tue, 14 Jan 2014 10:40:07 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
718 Current Anthropology Volume 54, Number 6, December 2013
specific aesthetic effects and generate significant financial prof-
its.
The prospect of mixing styles has recently begun to play a
key role in this broader sphere of computer-mediated, al-
gorithmic forms of sociality too and for similar reasons. A
growing number of critics have argued that as a result of how
media companies use computerized algorithms, individuals
no longer receive the same online content as one another, but
rather content that is customized to mirror each consumer’s
style, and that this situation results in stifling self-referentiality,
narcissism, atomism, and the fragmentation of the public
sphere (Pariser 2011:112–113, 160). Their discontent, then,
much like the discontent of the scientists I worked with, is
about styles that have become ossified. As a solution, these
critics have called for realizing these algorithms’ liberating
potential to disrupt, challenge, and reconfigure individuals’
habituated styles. If computerized algorithms can simulate
each person’s style, then, in principle, they can also provide
each person with content that will not be aligned with this
style and thus enable individuals to change their personal
styles if they wish to do so by “mixing” it with, that is, ex-
posing themselves to, styles different from their own. This
would require “crafting an algorithm that prioritizes ‘falsifi-
ability,’ that is, an algorithm that aims to disprove its idea of
who you are” (Pariser 2011:233). Indeed, some of the sug-
gestions for such falsifiability uncannily resemble the “cock-
tailing of styles” I witnessed in the lab: “Google or Facebook
could place a slider bar running from ‘only stuff I like’ to
‘stuff other people like that I’ll probably hate’ at the top of
search results and the News Feed, allowing users to set their
own balance between tight personalization and a more diverse
information flow” (Pariser 2011:235).
How might we conceptualize this contemporary historical
moment of facile “simulation and mixing of styles” with slid-
ers on a software interface that control for proportions—
technological developments that often concern individuals’
most ingrained patterns of behavior? What might be the im-
plications of the increased ubiquity of computerized algo-
rithms with respect to the notion of identity and the very
possibility of sociality? Most importantly, what might the im-
plications of this presumed liquidity of styles be for long-held
anthropological theories of culture?
In this article, I contribute to the growing anthropological
literature that has been concerned with theorizing the role
played by computerized algorithms in various ethnographic
sites (Downey 1998; Helmreich 1998; Kockelman 2011; Such-
man 2007; Zaloom 2006). I discuss the role played by com-
puterized algorithms in the simulation and mixing of styles
as a way to engage with, problematize, and reconfigure a long
and major tradition in cultural anthropology, which has ap-
propriated the notion of artistic style as part of its theorization
of the notion of culture. This tradition has conceptualized
culture as a relatively coherent and durable set or configu-
ration of dispositions, acquired through prolonged periods of
socialization by individuals who are forced, as it were, to enact
these dispositions in a quasi-automatic and consistent manner
in different situations, whether because these dispositions are
anchored in the unconscious, in the body, or in all-encom-
passing symbols (Bateson 1967; Benedict 2005 [1934]; Boas
1955 [1927]; Bourdieu 1977; Geertz 1973; Gell 1998; Kroeber
1957; Sapir 1985a). The notion of artistic style has provided
this tradition with a model for a number of core ideas about
culture, such as the totality of cultural integration, the per-
durability of culture, and culture as habituated and deeply
ingrained behavior over which individuals have little control
and over which they are mostly unaware but which can be
accounted for by the more cultivated and trained anthro-
pologist. I will argue that this tradition was informed by a
Romantic heritage of modeling the notion of culture on the
presumed purity of Western high art. Unpacking this heritage
is one of this essay’s goals.7
Another goal is to problematize this tradition in light of
the technological developments that are the focus of research
in the lab in which I conducted fieldwork. I argue that this
theoretical tradition is only partially useful for theorizing the
contemporary historical moment of facile simulation and
mixing of styles with computerized algorithms because it lim-
its each individual to enacting only one style or to shifting
between fixed styles and because it anchors styles in a stratum
over which individuals have little control. Consequently, this
tradition cannot account for the contemporary historical mo-
ment in which style, as a pattern of behavior, can be statis-
tically anticipated, reconfigured, and mixed with other styles
with relative ease by means of available technologies and in
which individuals can have increased control over such tech-
nologies and hence over their own styles.
In problematizing the anthropological tradition of theo-
rizing culture as artistic style, my purpose is not to “write
against culture” (Abu-Lughod 1991). To begin, my analysis
focuses on only one—albeit key (as is apparent from the
anthropologists I am concerned with)—tradition of theoriz-
ing culture in anthropology that has appropriated the notion
of style for this purpose. By focusing on anthropologists who
have theorized culture in the model of style in music and
art—a choice justified by the nature of the ethnographic data
I am concerned with—I am leaving out other key anthro-
pological traditions that have appropriated the notion of style
to theorize culture. For example, I will not be concerned with
the tradition that has looked at culture-as-language, which
has offered sophisticated accounts of the multiple function-
ality of culture in addition to its poetic function or text-
internal coherence (key figures in this tradition include, e.g.,
7. Thus, this article offers an account of the culture concept inanthropology
that is meant to complement rather than replace other accounts of similar
dimensions of this concept, such as Charles Briggs’s, who attributes the “prob-
lematic aspects of anthropological conceptions of culture” to “the particular
imaginings of language and linguistics used in articulating them” in Boasian
anthropology (Briggs 2002:482).
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Roman Jakobson [1960], Edward Sapir [1985b], and Michael
Silverstein [1995]).8
Furthermore, against the backdrop of specific technological
developments, my purpose is to critically engage with, rather
than to completely invalidate, the anthropological tradition
that has appropriated artistic style in its theorization of culture
and to figure out how this tradition might be reconfigured
to make sense of these developments. I suggest that the fact
that some of the founding figures in cultural anthropology
conceptualized culture as style and focused on the restraints
that underlie it means that their theory of culture can be
tweaked and made useful for elucidating the contemporary
historical moment of increased mediation of sociality by com-
puterized algorithms that routinely analyze people’s styles of
behavior as statistical probabilities and then allow individuals
to anticipate and reconfigure these styles. My argument is that
this historical moment should not be analyzed in terms of
one or a number of fixed styles, but rather through the prism
of styles of styling styles. In other words, the age of computer-
mediated, algorithmic forms of sociality might be better an-
alyzed through the restraints that govern the practices of styl-
ing styles with the aid of these algorithms and similar
technologies. While artistic style has been a model for the
integration, distinctiveness, and perdurability of culture in
anthropological theory, shifting the analytical lens to com-
puter-mediated, algorithmic forms of producing and mixing
styles reveals both the radically dynamic and agentive nature
of contemporary forms of sociality, as well as the restraints
that govern this dynamism. These restraints emanate both
from the nature of technology or means, that is, what can
and cannot be done with available technologies, and from
normative ideals that stipulate ends, that is, what should be
done with these available technologies. This article, then, is
both a critique and a reconfiguration of a specific anthro-
pological tradition of theorizing culture, aiming to make it
analytically relevant to an increasingly prevalent form of so-
ciality in the present historical moment.
Cultural Anthropology and the Notion of
Culture as Artistic Style
During the twentieth century, a number of key anthropolo-
gists appropriated the notion of artistic style to theorize cul-
ture. When their theories are examined in detail, a number
of shared foci become visible. First, style is used as a model
of cultural integration and coherence. Second, one of the key
manifestations of this integration is individuals’ consistent
behavior in different situations. Third, the restraints that are
responsible for making culture a consistent style and pattern
of behavior are anchored in strata that individuals cannot
easily access and over which they have little control, such as
the body, the unconscious, and overarching symbols—a fact
8. But see note 20. Sapir, to be sure, is someone who played a key role in
both traditions, as I will argue later.
that ensures the perdurability and integration of culture. Fi-
nally, cultures are defined by one or a few distinct styles.
For example, Franz Boas (1955 [1927]) analyzed style in
primitive art as part of his contribution to a theory of cultural
integration, which became one of the core theoretical foci of
Boasian anthropology (Stocking 1989:7–8). In his book Prim-
itive Art, Boas argued that “without stability of form of ob-
jects, manufactured or in common use, there is no style; and
stability of form depends upon the development of a high
technique” (1955 [1927]:11), defined as the “automatic reg-
ularity of movement” (20). Thus Boas explained style in prim-
itive art as the result of embodied habituation, among other
factors, which sinks below the level of consciousness, in the
same way that he explained other forms of cultural integration
in terms of unconscious categories (Stocking 1989:7). It is
important to note that Boas’s emphasis on embodied habit-
uation as the basis of style was not limited to artists’ “technical
virtuosity” (Boas 1955 [1927]:17). In a chapter specifically
dedicated to style, Boas discussed the embodied styles shared
by members of a culture as another explanation for the per-
durability of style in primitive art. Taking the throwing sticks
of the Eskimos as his example, he argued that “even if a
variation of form should appeal to the eye, it will not be
adopted if it should require a new adjustment of the hands”
(146). Thus, deeply ingrained embodied habits become a key
mechanism, which provides the restraints that account for
pattern or style and which ensures the perdurability of style
as a form of cultural integration.
A number of Boas’s immediate students modeled their the-
ories of cultural integration on the notion of artistic style.
Alfred Kroeber, perhaps more so than any other anthropol-
ogist, used the notion of artistic style to model cultural in-
tegration, or “the degree of coherence and congruity existing
between the many parts, organs, pieces, or items of which
every culture consists,” in a book significantly titled Style and
Civilizations (Kroeber 1957:85). Edward Sapir, too, wrote
about “the grooves of the cultural mold” and its inescapable
power over the individual (Sapir 1985a:313), adding that “the
highest manifestations of culture, the very quintessence of the
genius of a civilization, necessarily rest in art” (327), where
culture is reflected as a “unified and consistent attitude toward
life” (315). I will elaborate on Kroeber and Sapir in greater
detail below because their work reveals the intellectual heritage
of this emphasis much more so than the work of other an-
thropologists.
Another of Boas’s students, Ruth Benedict, suggested that
cultural integration is the result of the same process that is
responsible for the integration of “style in art” (Benedict 2005
[1934]:47) or “the great art-styles” (48). In her book, whose
title Patterns of Culture epitomizes the notion of culture as
style, Benedict famously argued that without a mechanism of
selection from the vast number of equally probable possibil-
ities of patterning or styling cultures, culture would be mean-
ingless—indeed, there would be no culture at all. Similarly
to Boas, she located the selection mechanism responsible for
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cultural integration outside of individuals’ conscious subjec-
tivity. She argued that the restraints or mechanisms of selec-
tion can be explained in terms of the culturally unconscious:
“A culture, like an individual, is a more or less consistent
pattern of thought and action” (46) “in accordance with un-
conscious canons of choice that develop within the culture”
(48).
These concerns also found expression in the work of an-
thropologists indirectly associated with the Boasian school.
For example, Gregory Bateson, writing about style in primitive
art, argued that an art object is “both itself internally patterned
and itself a part of a larger patterned universe—the culture
or some part of it” (1967:132). Bateson drew a clear analogy
between the patterned art object—its style—and the patterned
culture, conceptualized as style. In addition to the early in-
fluence that Benedict’s book Patterns of Culture exerted on
him, he did so as part of his appropriation of cybernetics and
the mathematical theory of information, which provided him
with the analytical tools needed to view culture and all its
instantiations as forms of information and patterns.9 Like
Boas, he anchored the selection mechanism that accounts for
style in the artist’s embodied habits: “The skill and the pat-
terning . . . depend upon muscular rote and muscular ac-
curacy” (Bateson 1967:148). Similarly, in a chapter on style
in primitive art, Alfred Gell argued that “style is to artworks
what group-identification is to social agents” (1998:163) in
that the nature of the relations between different artworks in
a specific style is structured by the key values and norms of
the culture to which that style belongs (I elaborate on Gell’s
ideas about style and innovation in greater detail below).
The notion of culture as style found expression in the work
of two of the most recently influential anthropologists, Clif-
ford Geertz and Pierre Bourdieu. Although they are typically
understood to have had very different ideas about what cul-
ture is—Bourdieu emphasizing the body as the infrastructure
of culture and its reproduction and Geertz highlighting sym-
bols as the stuff culture is made of—these real differences
masked significant similarities with respect to the role played
by the notion of style in their theories of culture. At one point
in Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu discussed the
notion of habitus thusly:
“Personal” style, the particular stamp marking all the prod-
ucts of the same habitus, whether practices or works, is never
more than a deviation in relation to the style of a period or
class so that it relates back to the common style not only
by its conformity . . . but also by the difference which makes
the whole “manner.” The principle of these individual dif-
ferences lies in the fact that . . . the habitus . . . brings about
a unique integration, dominated by the earliest experiences,
of the experiences statistically common to the members of
the same class. (Bourdieu 1977:86–87; emphasis added)
9. According to Margaret Mead, Bateson read and was influenced by Ruth
Benedict’s Patterns of Culture already in 1933, i.e., when it was circulated only
in a draft form. See Stocking (1988:3).
On the other side of the fence, as it were, stands Clifford
Geertz, who, at one point in The Interpretation of Cultures,
argued that “sacred symbols function to synthesize a people’s
ethos” (1973:89), creating what at another point in the book
he characterized as “a unity of style” (145). As for the actual
behavior of the individuals who share a culture, Geertz had
this to say:
[Religious symbols] both express the world’s climate and
shape it. They shape it by inducing in the worshipper a
certain distinctive set of dispositions (tendencies, capacities,
propensities, skills, habits, liabilities, pronenesses) which
lend a chronic character to the flow of his activity and the
quality of his experience. A disposition describes not an
activity or an occurrence but a probability of an activity
being performed or an occurrence occurring in certain cir-
cumstances. (Geertz 1973:95; emphasis added)
Note how, like the previous anthropologists I have dis-
cussed, Bourdieu and Geertz appropriate the notion of style
to talk about cultural integration. This allows them to theorize
culture as a perdurable form of integration over which in-
dividuals have little control and which manifests in individ-
uals’ propensity or a disposition to act in a consistent manner
in different situations. Here, too, there is a sense of the in-
evitability and distinctiveness of style. It finds expression in
Geertz’s notion of the “chronic character” of individuals’ be-
havior as a result of cultural integration and even more so in
Bourdieu’s portrayal of the habitus as embodied style/cul-
ture—a quasi inescapable matrix of personhood even when,
or especially when, one tries to subvert it.
In arguing that “fixity of style” is a prominent feature in
all of these theories, I am not suggesting that they neglected
to consider innovation. Rather, they conceptualized innova-
tion as the product of the exploration of the space of pos-
sibilities within the constraints of a specific style. Gell and
Bourdieu are particularly instructive in this regard and useful
for highlighting the challenges posed by the ethnographic data
I present below. In his attempt to provide “‘generative’ . . .
style descriptions for ‘ethnological’ art,” Gell (1998:158) ar-
gued that stylistic coherence is the result of a limited number
of “rules of transformation” that stipulate the ways in which
motifs can be combined with and transformed into one an-
other (in the case of Marquesan art—Gell’s specific case
study—such rules include, e.g., reflection, rotation, and du-
plication [Gell enumerates 12 rules]): “The constraints gov-
erning the production (innovation within culturally prescribed
parameters of style) of Marquesan artworks were constraints
governing the possibility of transforming a motif or form into
related forms. . . . It is a field of possible or legitimate motivic
transformations” (Gell 1998:215; emphasis added). Gell’s no-
tions of style and innovation are highly similar to Bourdieu’s.
Gell’s idea of rules of transformation (which he took from
Levi Strauss’s analysis of myths [see Gell 1998:175 n. 3]) are
reminiscent of Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus as a set of
dispositions, that is, embodied generative “schemes of per-
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ception and thought, extremely general in their application,”
which account for the stylistic coherence behind individuals’
behavior in new situations and circumstances (Bourdieu 1977:
15). In both cases, virtuosity and innovation are not about
changing the rules of transformation but rather mastering
them to such a degree that one can seamlessly and fluidly
behave in a “stylistically” sanctioned way even in new and
unexpected situations (Bourdieu 1977:79; Gell 1998:158).
Within a typology of kinds of creativity recently offered by
one scholar, this form of innovation consists in “exploring
conceptual spaces” or “structured styles of thought” (Boden
2003:4). Conceptual spaces are spaces of possibilities that de-
rive from a given set of restraints. Within this form of in-
novation, then, any novelty or “a new trick” is “something
that ‘fits’ . . . [an] established style: the potential was always
there” (Boden 2003:5).
As I show in the next section, the research conducted by
the scientists I worked with is motivated by fantasies about
the reversal of long-held assumptions about the perdurability,
inevitability, and fixity of style and the nature of innovation
that they stipulate. These fantasies motivate the development
of computerized algorithms that abstract style as information,
as a probability function that can be easily manipulated, and
that consequently enable the mixing and reconfiguration of
well-known styles in art. They are techniques of innovation
not within existing rules of transformation but rather through
the reconfiguration and transformation of such rules—that
is, at a higher level of the reality of style “so that thoughts
are now possible which previously (within the untransformed
space) were literally inconceivable” (Boden 2003:6). At stake
is a different form of innovation motivated by discontent with
styles that have become too familiar, as I now turn to discuss.
“They All Sound the Same”: Fixity of Style
and Its Discontents
I first met James, one of the lab directors, on the eve of a
concert in which Syrus and other projects developed in the
lab were to be featured (Wilf 2013b). I had written him an
e-mail message a few days earlier in which I had explained
my interest in conducting fieldwork in the lab. Specifically, I
had been intrigued by James’s ongoing research on the de-
velopment of robots that improvise rather than play precom-
posed pieces. In my message I had described my previous
study of contemporary modes of socialization into jazz in US
academic jazz programs as a way of framing my interest in
Syrus (Wilf 2010, 2012, 2014). I had explained that my pre-
vious research was about the rationalization of jazz sociali-
zation in higher education and that James’s attempt to “train”
Syrus to play jazz via computerized algorithms might be con-
ceptualized as an extension of this rationalization. However,
it soon became clear that James had a totally different inter-
pretation of what he was trying to do in relation to US ac-
ademic jazz education.
I arrived at the concert hall a few hours before the begin-
ning of the concert, during what seemed to be a break in a
rehearsal. I saw Syrus on the stage, positioned in front of the
marimba. James and his students were sitting amid open pizza
trays and talking to one another. After introducing myself to
James, I explained again my previous research on US academic
jazz education. I was in the middle of a sentence when James
interrupted me: “They all sound the same.” At first I was
confused. “Who?” I asked. “The students! They all sound the
same. Like machines!” He laughed. “And all the musicians
who come out of the schools, and like 99% of the jazz mu-
sicians today—they all sound the same. You know what they
say: jazz may not be dead but it sure smells funny.” As I was
thinking of what to say, James continued:
This is why I built Syrus. Because I wanted to be inspired.
I wasn’t inspired anymore by—everything that can be writ-
ten had already been written. Everything that can be played
had already been played. I felt that I understood all the
genres I was familiar with like jazz—there was nothing that
really caught my interest, a new sound, new ideas. I wanted
to develop a device or a tool that would generate new mu-
sical ideas that I could not come up with by myself, nor
could other people.
James’s comments seem to be contradictory because he
appears to argue that he wanted to build a machine that would
inspire people because people have become quasi-machines.
However, there is no real contradiction here because the ma-
chine in each case is of an entirely different kind. Critics of
standardization in US academic jazz education often rely on
tropes of machines associated with the industrial revolution,
which are based on repetitious and preprogrammed action
and that produce standardized objects (think of an early twen-
tieth-century car factory; see Wilf 2010:567–568). Syrus, how-
ever, is a machine of a very different kind: it is based on
algorithms known as Markov Models, which integrate sto-
chastic processes into their logic and whose output is thus
seldom repetitious and predictable. For example, for each jazz
master in whose style they want Syrus to play, the members
of the research team create a large database of this master’s
solos. These solos are in a MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital
Interface) format, which means that the files can be fed into
a computer program that can break the musical information
into chains of pitch and rhythm data that are represented
numerically (see figs. 2–4). These data are then analyzed
against chord changes score files (i.e., the harmonic sequences
on which the player improvised; see fig. 5, which represents
files of chord sequences of different standard jazz tunes).10
The system statistically analyzes this corpus to generate tran-
sition probabilities, that is, the probability that a certain future
state will follow a given present state. During performance,
and for each note played by Syrus, the system constantly
10. In straight-ahead jazz, players improvise on the sequence of chords
that structures a given tune while also taking into account other elements,
such as the tune’s melody and the contributions made by the other band
members.
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Figure 2. A chain of pitch data from a Charlie Parker solo. A color
version of this photo appears in the online edition of Current An-
thropology.
Figure 3. A chain of pitch data from a John Coltrane solo. A color
version of this photo appears in the online edition of Current An-
thropology.
searches for a match between the last sequence of notes per-
formed by the player who plays with Syrus (if Syrus takes
turns with a player) or by Syrus itself (if Syrus improvises by
itself ) and the chains of pitch and rhythm values derived from
the jazz master’s corpus, which are stored in the system’s
memory. The length of the sequence is determined in advance
(e.g., two or three notes each time). Any such search yields
a number of candidates. The system chooses stochastically—
that is, based on chance decisions weighted by a function of
likelihood, itself determined by the statistical analysis. When
a matched sequence is selected from the system’s database of
the master’s solos, the system instructs Syrus to play the note
that continues this sequence as it appears in the memory—
that is, to play the note that the master had played after he
or she played that specific sequence. The system’s decisions
(i.e., the notes Syrus plays) feed back in real time as new
input, and thus the decision process begins again. All this
computation takes place in real time and in a split second
prior to every note Syrus plays. Syrus, then, is a machine that
is supposed to simulate the contingency of human action and
thus to assist players who have become more like the machines
of yesteryear (Wilf 2013b).
However, as became clear on the following day when I met
James again, his criticism of the sterility of contemporary
music was not taking its inspiration solely from the model
of the repetitious machines that are emblematic of industrial
modernity. It was also directed against the way in which the
same computerized algorithms, which are at the center of his
research, are typically used in the broader field of algorithmic
music composition. Indeed, Markov processes have been used
in algorithmic music composition ever since the 1950s (Nier-
haus 2010). They are especially suitable for style imitation
based on the analysis of large corpora of music. James took
issue with scientists and composers who use the same com-
puterized algorithms he uses but for simulating well-known
and already familiar musical styles. Thus, at one point during
our conversation, James mentioned The Continuator, a soft-
ware written by the music technology scientist, Francois
Pachet (Pachet 2003; Wilf 2013a). This program is able to
learn and simulate the style of a player in real time and “con-
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Figure 4. A chain of rhythm data. A color version of this photo
appears in the online edition of Current Anthropology.
Figure 5. Chord changes score files of different jazz standard tunes.
A color version of this photo appears in the online edition of Current
Anthropology.
tinue” it in a kind of turn-taking interaction. James had this
much to say about this program, which also uses Markov
Models:
I think that The Continuator is more successful than us [i.e.,
his research team] in capturing a given style. It does more
complex things than we do. But on the other hand, I per-
sonally think that it was less successful than Syrus in in-
spiring because all it does—which is an achievement, don’t
get me wrong—is to capture—“wow, it sounds like Chick
Corea playing,”11 or “wow, it sounds like me.” When I
played with The Continuator I said: “yes, this is my style,”
but it did not inspire me because I already knew how
my style sounds, you know? What we did [in the lab]
was perhaps less sophisticated statistically. But combining
and morphing different styles—people have not done this
before. This is our novelty. In this way we can generate
responses that Chick Corea would have never thought
of because suddenly it’s 60% Chick Corea and 20% Miles
Davis and 20% you. This is where I expected the inspi-
ration to come from, which you cannot get from humans.
Thus, James’s malaise concerns not only repetitious ma-
11. James refers to the well-known jazz pianist Chick Corea.
chines or musicians but also machines that integrate stochastic
processes into their logic to simulate specific, fixed, and al-
ready familiar styles. For James, simulating already familiar
styles is not enough, even if this simulation relies on stochastic
processes. He feels that he is not inspired by it. It is for this
reason that he decided to mix different well-known styles with
one another. This facile mixing of styles, then, is the radical
development that requires us to rethink the anthropological
tradition of theorizing culture as artistic style. Returning to
this tradition, then, how might we approach its emphasis on
the integration, perdurability, and distinctiveness of style in
light of these contemporary technological developments that
seem to radically problematize it?
The Romantic Roots of the Anthropological
Notion of Culture as Artistic Style
A first step in salvaging inadequate analytical paradigms—
inadequate, at least, with respect to specific problems—is to
unpack their intellectual and historical roots and clarify the
context that engendered their problematic elements and then
see if they can be reconfigured and made analytically useful
again. I suggest that with respect to the anthropological tra-
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dition that has theorized culture as artistic style, this context
is anthropology’s Romantic heritage.
Conventional accounts have acknowledged the impact of
German Romanticism on the making of modern cultural an-
thropology, especially in its American context (Stocking
1989), and have pointed to a number of Romantic ideas that
found their way into the fabric of the discipline and resulted
in a distinct notion of culture (Bunzl 1998; Stocking 1988).
Most well known, perhaps, is the argument that the Herderian
idea that each group is an organic whole that embodies a
unique genius and that can only be understood in terms of
its unique history and context informed Boas’s emphasis on
cultural pluralism and determinism as opposed to racial de-
terminism or the notion of history as the evolutionary un-
folding of a universal current. This “German romantic tra-
dition” allowed Boas to develop “a thoroughgoing critique of
the fundamental assumptions of evolutionist ethnology”
(Stocking 1966:871) and thus leave behind a notion of culture
“in the humanist or the evolutionist sense . . . associated with
the progressive accumulation of the characteristic manifes-
tations of human creativity” such as “art” and develop an
alternative concept of culture as habituated tradition within
a framework of cultural determinism (Stocking 1966:870).
However, what such accounts have underestimated is the
degree to which the emblematic “manifestation[s] of human
creativity” that is art—and especially the notion of artistic
style—has continued to inform the culture concept in major
currents of Boasian anthropology, as the frequent allusions
to artistic style made by some of the founding figures I dis-
cussed above and will discuss below make it clear. Indeed, it
would be hard to imagine it any other way for if there was
one human activity around which Romanticism in its different
guises coalesced, it was art. For most of the Romantic thinkers,
art was considered to be “the most important human activity”
(Taylor 1989:376; Wilf 2011), and it was through its theo-
retization and practice that these thinkers arrived at, dem-
onstrated, and solidified their notions of humanity. I thus
suggest that the culture concept in modern anthropology has
been significantly informed by Romantic notions of artistic
style and that to understand the former we need to unpack
the contours of the latter.
One of the distinctive features of the modern notion of
artistic style is that it has instituted a concern not merely with
the unity that underlies the oeuvre of one artist but the oeu-
vres of different artists (e.g., the unity of style in Expression-
ism), thus connoting integration on a scale that is higher than
that of the individual artist. This notion of style is typically
dated to Johann Winckelmann’s mid-eighteenth-century
writings on art (Winckelmann 1972), in which he focused on
artistic style as the crystallized expression of a broader way
of life of the social group within which a specific artwork
emerged. Winckelmann anchored his analysis of “period
styles” in different groups’ social conditions, religion, cus-
toms, and climate. Significantly, Winckelmann’s “treatment
of Greek style as an expression of the Greek way of life en-
couraged Herder and others to do the same for the medieval
Gothic” (Gombrich 1968:354). In other words, we can see
here a connecting line between early formulations of the mod-
ern notion of artistic style and early anthropological for-
mulations of the notion of culture as an organic whole whose
different instantiations are unified by a common idea or geist.
This notion of style, which was first highlighted in the
context of artworks and then in the context of general cultural
phenomena, informed the thought of a number of key think-
ers in the genre of the philosophy of history who theorized
the unifying basis of cultures or civilizations in terms of ar-
tistic style and who, in turn, influenced a number of the key
anthropologists I have discussed above. For example, it un-
derlined Oswald Spengler’s momentous oeuvre The Decline
of the West, in which he suggested a typology of different
kinds of “Cultures,” such as the “Western,” “Egyptian,” ”Chi-
nese,” or “Arabian,” according to their distinctive styles. He
argued that “The style, like the Culture, is a prime phenom-
enon in the strictest Goethian sense, be it the style of art or
religion or thought, or the style of life itself. . . . In the general
historical picture of a Culture there can be but one style, the
style of the Culture” (Spengler 1991 [1918]:110). Spengler’s
phraseology explains why the notion of artistic style has lent
itself to anthropological theorizations of culture: style denotes
the same kind of integration of seemingly distinct parts sug-
gested by the culture concept; most importantly, it is inte-
gration at the level of the presumably emblematic human
phenomenon.
The interchangeability of the notion of artistic style and a
specific character of a culture or a civilization found expres-
sion in the writing of another author in this genre, Arnold
Toynbee, who argued that “if, then, it is accepted that every
civilization has a style of its own in the domain of art, we
have to inquire whether the qualitative uniqueness which is
the essence of style can appear in this one domain without
pervading all the parts and organs and institutions and ac-
tivities of each separate civilization” (Toynbee 1987:242).
Toynbee’s answer is that style cannot appear in art without
pervading the rest of culture, and he consequently offered a
typology of cultures according to the “bent or bias” unique
to each of them.
It is with this kind of integration that another key figure
in this intellectual genealogy was concerned: the sociologist
Pitirim Sorokin. Sorokin opens his magnum opus Social and
Cultural Dynamics (1957 [1937]) with an introductory chap-
ter entitled “Forms and Problems of Culture Integration and
Methods of Their Study.” He differentiates between four pos-
sible types of cultural integration, ordered hierarchically in
terms of how much they are unique to human culture as
opposed to other entities. The form of integration most spe-
cific to human culture is “Logico-meaningful Integration of
Culture.” Sorokin characterizes this last form of integration
as “‘consistent style,’ ‘consistent and harmonious whole,’ in
contradistinction to ‘inconsistent mingling of styles,’ ‘hodge-
podge,’ ‘clashing’ patterns or forms,” and he suggests that
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these are terms which “apply especially to the examination
of artistic creation” (Sorokin 1957 [1937]:8). Sorokin adds
that
many such superlative unities [which display this kind of
integration] cannot be described in analytical verbal terms;
they are just felt as such, but this in no way makes their
unity questionable. One cannot prove by mere words—no
matter what they are—the inner consistency and supreme
integration of the Cathedral of Chartres, or the Gregorian
chant, or the musical compositions of Bach or Mozart or
Beethoven, or the tragedies of Shakespeare, or the sculpture
of Phidias, or the pictures of Du¨rer or Raphael or Rem-
brandt, or many other logico-meaningful unities. But . . .
their supreme unity is felt by competent persons as certainly
as if they could be analyzed with mathematical or logical
exactness. (Sorokin 1957 [1937]:8)
I quote from Sorokin in detail because of his influence on
a number of anthropologists. Although Ruth Benedict did not
credit Sorokin as an influence, another member of the culture
and personality school did. In a 1945 American Anthropologist
article, Laura Thompson argued that “a close study of the
covert aspects of the Hopi culture reveals that it is charac-
terized by a high degree of still another, more subtle and
distinctly human type of integration; namely, an abstract, log-
ical unity which reinforces its organic wholeness at both the
conceptual and aesthetic levels. The purpose of this paper is
to describe this logico-aesthetic integration” (Thompson
1945:540),12 which she describes elsewhere as “‘configuration’
or style” (Thompson 1945:552). More significant is the fact
that a decade later, Clifford Geertz, who was Sorokin’s student
at Harvard, explained social change as a clash “between what
Sorokin has called ‘logico-meaningful integration’ and what
he has called ‘causal-functional integration.’ By logico-mean-
ingful integration, characteristic of culture, is meant the sort
of integration one finds in a Bach fugue; . . . it is a unity of
style” (Geertz 1973:145 [the essay was originally published in
1956]).
Five points stand out in these arguments, which bring to
mind the arguments of the different anthropologists I have
previously discussed: cultures have but one artistic style (note
Sorokin’s rejection of “mingling of styles”); the style of a
specific culture’s art is the most iconic of this culture’s broader
style and of the form of integration that underlies it; the art
that is the most emblematic of this type of integration is
Western high art; apprehending this form of integration re-
quires “feeling”; only a “competent” observer can appreciate
this form of integration to the fullest. I argue that these points
found their way into the culture concept in modern anthro-
pology, the last two points corresponding to the method of
Verstehen and the assumption that the anthropologist has a
privileged access to understanding the true nature of cultural
phenomena of which less refined people—often called na-
12. At this point, Thompson references Sorokin in a footnote.
tives—remain ignorant.13 Thus, although the phenomena that
modern anthropology studied under the term “culture” did
not concern solely “the progressive accumulation of the char-
acteristic manifestations of human creativity” such as “art”
(Stocking 1966:870), they did continue to be encompassed
under and understood through the kind of stylistic unity at-
tributed to Western high art within a specific intellectual tra-
dition. This genealogy explains the inadequacy of this tra-
dition to account not only for the kind of “mingling of styles”
that is fast becoming a key logic of sociality in the present
historical moment but also for anthropology’s long-held dif-
ficulty to theorize the dynamism and fluidity that characterize
social life in general.
This intellectual genealogy is most evident in the oeuvre
of one of Boas’s most important students, Alfred Kroeber. In
his book Style and Civilizations (1957), Kroeber explicitly ac-
knowledges Spengler, Toynbee, and Sorokin as key influences
on his thought, although he does not hesitate to critically
engage with their theories of culture as style. Kroeber argues
that Spengler took “his point of view from Nietzsche, who
had said: ‘Culture is unity of artistic style in all the life man-
ifestations of a people’” (Kroeber 1957:88). Although Kroeber
rejects Spengler’s more ostentatious claims about the teleo-
logical growth and death of cultures, he credits him for high-
lighting “a large problem of great interest,” namely, “how far
a culture may legitimately and profitably be viewed as a sort
of style, perhaps something like what I have already called a
superstyle, or a style of styles: a total style of life” (Kroeber
1957:88). Kroeber’s answer is in the affirmative: “Something
of a coherent characterization of our civilization seems to be
achieved” (Kroeber 1957:102).14 He suggests that precisely
because style in culture is not as integrated as artistic style
that artistic style should serve as a kind of an ideal type of
what cultural integration in its various dimensions looks like.
Similarly to Sorokin, he frames a hierarchy of epistemological
skills with respect to different people’s abilities to apprehend
the stylistic unity of a culture. Arguing that style is about form
rather than subject matter, he adds that “the layman,” “chil-
dren and the completely untutored” may be “little aware of
the form” because they are taken by the subject matter (Kroe-
ber 1957:26–27).15 Additionally, although Kroeber is forced
to acknowledge that modern society consists of a number of
13. It is typically acknowledged that Romanticism contributed to anthro-
pology not only ideas about the ontology of cultures but also about the
methodology of studying them. The notion, advanced by Humboldt and later
Dilthey, that understanding a culture requires scholars to use intuition, em-
pathy, and feeling as a way of grasping the cultural unity that underlies what
on the surface appear to be disparate elements had a tremendous impact on
how anthropologists have come to understand their craft (Bunzl 1998:25).
14. For the persistence of these ideas in contemporary anthropological
theory, see these two recent examples (El Or 2012:441–442; Henshilwood and
Dubreuil 2012:133).
15. This argument owes to the Kantian tradition of privileging form over
subject matter as the essence of high art, a distinction that has traditionally
been used by the cultivated Bourgeoisie to distinguish themselves from the
lower classes (Bourdieu 1980).
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styles, his way of formulating this plurality suggests that purity
of style underlies his, much like Sorokin’s, notion of plurality.
Taking his cue from artistic styles, Kroeber argues thusly:
No one can accuse Picasso of being indecisive in execution,
of weakness; he is highly original, and he is supremely
skilled, even if his art is split stylistically. If his single per-
sonality can contain several styles without mishmashing
them—as Goethe already successfully expressed ultraroman-
ticism and Hellenic classicism side by side—surely a world
art should be able to contain them. The weaker practitioners
will blend and fudge and eclecticize; but they will have less
influence and be soon forgotten. (Kroeber 1957:51; emphasis
added)
Many of the same emphases structure Sapir’s notion of
“the genuine culture,” which he defines as “inherently har-
monious, balanced, self-satisfactory,” “not a spiritual hybrid
of contradictory patches, of water-tight compartments of con-
sciousness that avoid participation in a harmonious synthesis”
(Sapir 1985a:314–315). Sapir’s Romantic heritage finds its
clearest expression when he discusses “genuine cultures” in
terms of “genius” and “healthy spiritual organisms, such as
the Athenian culture of the Age of Pericles,” whose health we
immediately and “instinctively feel” (315).
That we find artistic style playing an important role in the
theories of a number of key anthropologists, such as Boas,
Kroeber, Sapir, Benedict, Bateson, Geertz, Bourdieu, and Gell,
is noteworthy. It suggests that anthropology’s emphasis on
the “one culture for one society” principle stems in part from
the view of Western high art as an emblematic form of cultural
integration, a pure form that inevitably loses its purity and
“logical necessity” when it is mixed with other styles.
Interestingly, jazz filled the slot of the potentially polluting
style with respect to Western high art, and specifically Western
classical music, in at least two places that are worth men-
tioning.16 At one point in his book, Sorokin argues that, “A
competent person could listen as many times as you like to
a musical composition where jazz and crooning are inter-
spersed with bars from Tschaikovsky [sic], Stravinsky, or Wag-
ner. Any number of repetitions of these bars would not oblige
him in any way to declare that such musical compositions
are logical and consistent unities” (Sorokin 1957 [1937]:12).
Compare this statement with the following one, made by
another pair of gatekeepers, Max Horkheimer and Theodor
Adorno: “A jazz musician who has to play a piece of serious
music, Beethoven’s simplest minuet, involuntarily syncopates,
and condescends to start on the beat only with a superior
smile. Such ‘naturalness’ . . . constitutes the new style, ‘a
system of nonculture to which one might even concede a
certain “unity of style” if it made any sense to speak of a
stylized barbarism’” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002:101; em-
16. For an analysis of contemporary institutional sites within which jazz
is framed as a potentially polluting agent vis-a`-vis Western classical music,
see Bruno Nettl’s ethnography of music conservatories in the United States
(Nettl 1995:82–111).
phasis added).17 Note how this last statement, which—like
Kroeber’s paraphrase of Spengler—incorporates a quote from
Nietzsche,18 denies any possibility for the reconciliation of
Western classical music with jazz. Such mingling of styles can
only result in a “unity of style” in the sense of “stylized bar-
barism,” that is, “nonculture”—a clear example (this time
from outside of anthropology) of the kind of debt owed by
the culture concept as a unified and coherent whole to the
idea of the purity of artistic style, more specifically in Western
high art.
Within the confines of this intellectual tradition, there is
very little hope of making sense of the phenomena I am
concerned with, of which the following vignette is a typical
example. One day, as I approached the lab, I heard from
within the closed doors a strange mix of sounds. What I heard
was both familiar and strange. I opened the door with my
access card and entered the room. Kim, a member of the lab’s
research team, was playing the electric keyboard that is
plugged to the computer that controls Syrus. He looked in-
tently at Syrus while playing. David, another member of the
research team, was looking at one of the computer monitors.
I recognized the first movement of Beethoven’s Moonlight
Sonata, which Kim played with ease. Suddenly Syrus started
to play on the marimba while Kim continued to play the
sonata. I listened carefully. I could identify in Syrus’s playing
rhythmic and melodic motifs taken from what Kim had just
played, but these were only hints. Syrus did not copy Kim’s
playing but rather loosely weaved bits and pieces from it into
its own playing. At one point, Kim turned to David and said:
“The Jazz style produces much more interesting results than
the Rock style, right?” David answered, “Yes, definitely!” I
approached David, looked at the monitor, and saw that he
was shifting a slider called Jazz with the cursor. Two other
minimized windows had two different sliders titled Rock and
Classical (see fig. 6).
As I realized after this session was over, Kim and David
were trying to figure out which preprogrammed “style” would
lead Syrus to produce more interesting responses to Beetho-
ven’s Moonlight Sonata. These preprogrammed styles were
based on a statistical analysis of a few selected music pieces
that belong to specific genres. In the weeks that followed this
session, I observed other sessions in which Syrus was in-
structed to respond in a “classical style” to a jazz piece or to
respond in a “jazz style” to a classical piece that were played
or improvised by Kim or another student on the electric
piano. In an interview with John, a doctoral student who
originally compiled these styles, he told me the following
about this aspect of the research:
That was something I was just playing around with. What
I was interested in was what if I take, for example, Mozart
and Chopin and mix them and then introduce it to a jazz
17. I thank Michael Silverstein for directing my attention to Horkheimer
and Adorno’s argument.
18. For the exact reference, see Horkheimer and Adorno (2002:269).
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Figure 6. A slider for controlling proportions of “classical” style. A color version of this photo appears in the online edition of Current
Anthropology.
standard and see what comes out. Or another time I was
going to throw a couple of Romantic composers together
and then I was going to throw modern harmonic language
at it and see how it responds. With all those styles, I was
just curious what would come out because we had this
engine there and it can treat all the music the same way so
I was just curious what would come out. . . . It definitely
created interesting results that were a lot of fun to play with.
And it felt new. It wasn’t something you heard before. That
was the part that I found the most interesting in the re-
search.19
How might we conceptualize these practices other than
“stylized barbarism” or “a system of nonculture”? How can
we account for these practices’ playful, creative elements,
made possible by the availability of such “engines,” that is,
computerized algorithms specifically programmed to handle
such tasks? How might we reconfigure the anthropological
tradition that theorizes culture as artistic style to make sense
of these phenomena?
19. See other examples of style mixing that involves jazz in Boden (2003:
312) and Cope (2005).
From Style to Styles of Styling Styles
I suggest that the answer might lie, ironically, with the insight
of the key anthropologists I have discussed above, according
to which a theory of style must be a theory of specific restraints
that create patterned phenomena. These anthropologists un-
derstood that style represents a relatively consistent choice,
governed by specific restraints, from among equally probable
possibilities. Their efforts to provide detailed ethnographic
accounts of the various selection mechanisms or restraints
that result in styles or patterned behavior—whether these are
anchored in the unconscious, the body, or symbols—are com-
mendable, although their theories of culture as artistic style
were informed by the misguided notion of the purity of cul-
ture as one or a limited number of well-defined styles and
by the notion that restraints must be inaccessible to individ-
uals or that innovation can mostly take place within these
restraints. Indeed, they were not ready to deal with nonhuman
agents such as computerized algorithms, which provide users
with the dynamic control of restraints and of probabilities of
selection and hence the option to reconfigure existing styles
of behavior by reconfiguring these restraints with relative ease.
Computerized algorithms change the rules of the game
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because they are highly reliable mechanisms that enable users
to easily reconfigure the restraints or rules of transformation
themselves and thus to generate new styles understood as
consistent forms of behavior in some modality. When James
and his research team program Syrus to mix the styles of a
number of masters, they are engaging in a specific form of
creativity of a higher order than the one featured in the an-
thropological theories of style I discussed above. This form
of innovation consists in “transforming the space”: they
change preexisting styles, tweaking them, or even radically
transforming them, “so that thoughts are now possible which
previously (within the untransformed space) were literally
inconceivable” (Boden 2003:6). On one level, style now be-
comes a matter of agency that is much less restrained than
before. While people have always engaged in some form of
styling styles (Hebdige 2005), the possibilities and the ease to
do so have now increased in such a way that we need to
develop a new conceptual framework, albeit one that draws
on old frameworks. When John explained to me matter-of-
factly his and the other students’ mode of experimenting with
mixing different styles by saying “we had this engine,” he
conveyed the ease and the new possibilities opened up by
these relatively new, and increasingly ubiquitous, nonhuman
agents, which bring intentional agency and styles under one
roof as never before.20
However, while on one level style becomes much less re-
strained than before, on another level it remains equally re-
strained. Restraints continue to have an impact but on the
level of the practices of styling styles with these new com-
puterized technologies. I argue, then, that in analyzing com-
puter-mediated, algorithmic forms of sociality, we should do
so not through the prism of a fixed style, a limited number
20. At this point it would be apt to note in passing why some of the most
nuanced approaches to the analysis of style as a dynamic feature in real-time
communicative events, which were developed within linguistic anthropology
and in the context of which agentive individuals are conceptualized not only
as sets of distinct styles but also as techniques of generating styles in real time
(see Bakhtin 1981; Eckert and Rickford 2002; Goffman 1981), are also limited
in their capacity to account for these new technological developments. Spe-
cifically, these approaches do not capture the facility, enhanced control, and
heightened conscious agency that are entailed in style mixing via computerized
algorithms. Linguistic anthropological approaches to style manipulation have
tended to treat the question of agency as in the following example, which
takes style and stance as its objects of study. After arguing that “all linguistic
patterns of use arise from decisions people make in interaction when they
are talking to a real person and thinking about ‘who they are’ in relation to
that person or people” (Kiesling 2009:172), Kiesling adds the following end-
note: “These decisions are not necessarily ‘conscious’ in the sense of being
open to reflection, in the same way that we do not calculate all of the actions
necessary and do calculus in order to catch a ball” (Kiesling 2009:192). Subtler
approaches to calculation have revealed that calculation rarely takes place
exclusively inside individuals’ “heads” but rather depends on material ar-
rangements and external systems of measurement that often remain unac-
counted for (Callon and Law 2005). The style manipulation I am concerned
with is subject to heightened conscious control and reflection precisely because
“the calculation” is performed by nonhuman agents, i.e., computerized al-
gorithms, on behalf of human agents. This frees the latter to be much more
consciously agentive with their manipulation of styles.
of styles, or the shifting between styles, but rather through
the prism of styles of styling styles, and I suggest that rather
than discard altogether the anthropological tradition that has
conceptualized culture as artistic style, we should retain its
ethnographic sensitivity to the various forms of restraints that
govern style. Not only is this emphasis necessary for theorizing
the computerized algorithms as technologies that enable in-
dividuals to control, shift, and create restraints and thus to
reconfigure with ease existing styles and shape new ones, but
it is indispensable for theorizing these practices of styling
styles as styles governed by their own specific restraints.
What might such restraints be? There are a number of obvious
candidates. To begin, the technology that is involved in these
practices poses some of its own specific restraints. Although critics
have correctly cautioned against technological determinism
(Coleman 2010), they have also demonstrated that the interaction
with technologies is not a one-directional relationship where hu-
man capabilities are delegated to technologies. Rather, technol-
ogies prescribe back to humans, who must learn to operate them,
and to social practices that must be organized around these
prescriptions (Latour 2005). Similarly, the technology used in the
simulation and mixing of styles in the lab in which I conducted
fieldwork is productive of specific restraints that stylize the prac-
tice of styling styles enabled by this technology.
To illustrate this point, consider the following vignette. One
day, as I was checking my e-mail in my workstation, David
entered the lab. He greeted me and the other students present
and then sat in front of the electric piano. I saw that Syrus
was turned off, so I assumed that David was planning to just
fool around on the keyboard, a practice that many students
engaged in from time to time as diversion from work. David
started to play what seemed to be rather conventional musical
phrases but in a highly unconventional way. He played one
note with his left hand and the successive note with his right
hand and so forth in a rapid fashion, each note on a different
section of the keyboard. The music he produced had a zigzag-
like contour. Suddenly, Kim’s head, which up until that point
was hidden behind the computer monitor in his workstation,
appeared with a smile: “Syrus Music!” he exclaimed. I looked
at David and saw that he was smiling to himself while con-
tinuing to play these highly convoluted phrases.
In a conversation a few hours later, I asked David what
Kim had meant by “Syrus Music.” David laughed and told
me the following:
You see, Syrus has its own style because of the arm move-
ments and the limitations. You’d hear the beginning of a
natural run [i.e, a phrase that consists of notes adjacent to
one another] and then suddenly a note would go up in the
octave—you’d hear some note being played by a different
arm in a different octave because the first arm is not fast
enough to play it so the other arm would compensate for
it. And I think that’s unique to Syrus. So Kim would some-
times refer to this as “Syrus Music” and he’d play this way,
This content downloaded from 128.195.74.65 on Tue, 14 Jan 2014 10:40:07 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Wilf Toward an Anthropology of Computer-Mediated, Algorithmic Forms of Sociality 729
and he’d say, “This is Syrus Music!” [laughter]. So today I
just decided to do the same.
David’s comments highlight the fact that practices of styling
styles are constrained and hence styled by the material infra-
structure of the available technologies that enable such styling
to begin with. There will always be some material stratum
imposing its own restraints, limitations, and embodied realities,
which will eventually result in a certain style of styling styles
in a particular domain. The limits of computing power, the
need to dissipate heat from processors, and so forth—there are
myriad of restraints at the material level of technologies, which
are bound to result in a style of styling styles (Hayles 1999).
The restraints that result from Syrus’s particular features—the
speed at which one arm can play successive notes, for exam-
ple—is productive of a residual style that pervades its playing
regardless of which jazz style or mix of styles it happens to play
at any given moment. Everything Syrus plays will have the edgy
style the students associate with its playing because when one
arm cannot play a note, another arm will play it in a different
octave on a different part of the marimba.
If one crucial source of restraints that result in a style of styling
styles is found on the level of technology or means, another
source is found on the level of the normative ideals that stipulate
the ends to which people choose to use specific technologies of
styling styles. Thus, the members of the research team in the lab
are motivated by a set of normative ideals that stipulate that
creativity can be quantified, divided into building blocks, and
recombined with the building blocks of the creative agency of
another person to profit from the strengths of each. For example,
in one of the tentative research plans that John, one of the PhD
students, wrote in the lab, we find the following: “In an impro-
visation scenario the user may want to have Syrus implement
Miles Davis’s voiceleading with harmonic progressions in the
style of John Coltrane’s ‘Giant Steps,’ and Bach’s voiceleading;
this would be done by only recalling data files specific to these
categories.” John’s suggestions draw from a specific paradigm of
creativity with a long history in the West, that is, creativity as
the product of combinatorics (Selfridge-Field 2001). Combined
with specific machineries of knowledge production that enable
users to take this paradigm to its logical extreme,21 the result is
a specific style of styling styles.
Coda
It is apt to conclude this essay with the May 2012 news about
Facebook’s public offering of its stocks, which ripped $16 bil-
21. Compare this mash-up of styles and its conditions of possibility and
implications with new developments in the field of bioinformatics, which
allow “lateral translations” of genetic material between, and “horizontal leaps
across,” different branches of these trees (Mackenzie 2003:321). These de-
velopments, which are enabled to a large extent by the algorithmic processing
of genetic material as digital information, are creating new kinship and bio-
political imaginaries, which have hitherto been dominated by the model of
the tree structure naturalized and given a scientific status by Darwin in the
nineteenth century (see also Helmreich 2003).
lion, making it the third-largest sale in U.S. history at that time.
With hundreds of millions of users, the company is a testimony
to the increasing role played by computerized algorithms in
mediating contemporary forms of sociality and in generating
huge profits based on their ability to anticipate people’s styles
and patterns of behavior in various modalities. That artistic
style has been a key trope in anthropological theories of culture
from the outset means that anthropology is well positioned to
make sense of these technological developments provided that
its theories of culture as artistic style are reconfigured in light
of these developments. This reconfiguration requires that we
uncover the ideological baggage that informed these theories
in the context of which the enormous success of companies
such as Facebook and Google, as well as the strategies devised
to mitigate their power and effects, have little sense. The tech-
nology that allows us to simulate and anticipate styles with
great accuracy and facility is also the one that enables individ-
uals to mix styles with one another and thus to reconfigure
each of them. Neither the former nor the latter are instances
of “nonculture.” Rather, they are the stuff culture is increasingly
made of in the contemporary historical moment in many con-
texts, whether we choose to click the “like button” or not.
Anthropologists have much to gain from studying the role
played by computerized algorithms in mediating these increas-
ingly ubiquitous forms of sociality.
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I frame my teaching through the lens of power, focusing on
how people and ideas become marginalized not only by vi-
olence and overt discrimination but often because they are
forced, suggested, or assumed to speak on another’s terms.
This is what algorithmic processing structurally does: it moves
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us and our cultural practices to speak according to a distinct
set of terms. These terms can be found in even the most un-
algorithmic of places. Movie scripts can be green-lit by algo-
rithms (Eliashberg, Hui, and Zhang 2007). A single professor’s
algorithm has been used to produce over 200,000 different
books (Cohen 2008). And in the case of Eitan Wilf ’s engaging
ethnography, algorithms are currently defining styles of jazz
music.
Wilf ’s understanding of algorithm as “styles of styling
styles” is an effective way to detail how algorithmic terms are
determining the future of culture and style. Musical inno-
vation here becomes indebted to characteristics of algorithmic
logics: of sliders, of quantification, of being able to, with the
most serious of faces, add a variable like “Monk” to the var-
iable “Coltrane.” Here, algorithm not only forces culture to
speak on its terms, but it reconstitutes what culture is and
can be.
This is formative work done by Wilf, of assigning algo-
rithmic procedures as more than just participants in culture.
Algorithms are increasingly founding the ontology for cultural
production. Jazz as performed by Syrus, the marimba-playing
robot musician, is not jazz  computation. It is jazz recon-
stituted through algorithm, replete with the limitations and
regulation implicit in computation. Jazz by Syrus is a different
type of jazz, one that listens to tones as Hertz-defined notes,
not as sounds. A saxophonist who “growls” into her mouth-
piece, for example, would likely remain unintelligible to the
algorithms that make up Syrus’s software. The notes she does
play, or the sounds that are interpreted as notes by Syrus, are
what count. What is not available, what is unable to be mea-
sured, is discarded as data debris.
Indeed, even the pseudo-pathos implicit in Adorno’s cri-
tique of jazz, of a bandmaster shouting “swing it boys” to
permit, but more importantly declare the beginning of, im-
provisation, finds itself at odds with the robotic heart of Syrus
(Adorno 1990). To repurpose a quotation by Franz Boas,
algorithms actually do become “a new adjustment of the
hand” precisely because they operate within a separate on-
tology (Boas 1955 [1927] as cited in by Wilf ). What consti-
tutes algorithmic processing is different than what makes jazz
as we have historically known it. Music mixed by sliders is
an increasingly useful diagrammatic to see algorithms’ func-
tion in cultural production. Quantifiable knobs and dials en-
able a user to amp up or decrease a discrete musical style.
But this algorithmic practice also reconfigures culture itself
to fit within the rubric of a slider.
On that point, I would be interested in hearing Wilf think
through algorithms as more than mechanisms operating within
restraints. We are not just dealing with technological/material
limitations that produce the “embodied realities” of a machine.
We are also experiencing a foundational shift transforming the
complexities of style into definable (discrete), quantifiable (pro-
cessed), and modulatory (dynamic and in “real time”) elements.
Algorithms like those that undergird Syrus function ac-
cording to strict, readable patterns, not perceived essences.
The feeling that emanates from a piece performed by John
Coltrane hits us each on an individual level. But when
Coltrane is not only played but interpreted by algorithm, we
are dealing with something that is not necessarily Coltrane.
We are dealing with an algorithmic assessment of Coltrane,
a paraphrasing or a representation. But, much like represen-
tation itself, algorithms represent in a literal form by pre-
senting anew according to their own unique, quantifiable
terms.
By understanding style as formed, and not just mediated
through algorithm, we must attend to the all sorts of qualities
that make algorithm “algorithmic.” Algorithm does not just
provide new elements from which innovation can come.
Rather, style as an algorithmically defined category determines
unity, which then determines cultural validity and use. Wilf
is entirely correct to emphasize the creative practices that
come from music “engines,” but we should go further to think
of style in a fundamentally algorithmic way. Algorithmic sty-
listic unity is not about socially construed, accepted forms of
artistic and cultural practice. It is about commonality models,
about taking what can be known (tones as Hertz) and con-
sidering that knowledge vis-a`-vis rhythm, harmony, and rests.
We could play alongside an algorithmically represented
John Coltrane, but its response to our playing, and our in-
terpretation of its own musicality, is made according to its
algorithmic terms. This is where Wilf ’s idea of limitation can
be encountered, but also where research must proceed. Wilf
asks us to think of innovation alongside algorithm. I ask us
to think of how algorithm frames innovation.
Alessandro Duranti
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Ange-
les, 341 Haines Hall, Los Angeles, California 90095-1553, U.S.A.
(aduranti@anthro.ucla.edu). 1 V 13
I see traces of two projects in this article: an empirical project—
with theoretical implications—on contemporary pedagogy for
improvisation and a theoretical project—with methodological
implications—on the relevance of established analytical dis-
tinctions within anthropology. Eitan Wilf is committed to both
projects. He has published insightful accounts of the ways in
which colleges, universities, and conservatories try to create new
contexts and activities for transmitting or renewing an estab-
lished art form, for example, jazz (Wilf 2010, 2011, 2012), and
he has used his insider-outsider observations of music pro-
duction and performance to theorize about paradoxes hidden
in our very notions of tradition and innovation. In the latest
installment of this double project, Wilf engages his readers to
reexamine the notion of culture as style while hinting at the
challenge that anthropologists face when studying computer-
mediated sociability. In addition to providing a critical appraisal
of the debt that anthropologists owe to the study of art, this
study also speaks to a growing interest in creativity and in-
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novation (e.g., Hallam and Ingold 2007; Lavie, Narayan, and
Rosaldo 1993; Liep 2001), which includes improvisation not
only as a recurrent musical practice—something that (ethno)-
musicologists (e.g., Nettl and Russell 1998) have studied for
some time—but also as a ubiquitous property of everyday life
and thus a key ingredient of any kind of socialization (Bourdieu
1977; Duranti and Black 2012; Sawyer 2001).
Wilf criticizes anthropologists in the past who equated cul-
ture with artistic style and thus “were not able to deal with
nonhuman agents such as computerized algorithms.” I actually
think that the problem in dealing with the type of complex
human-machine interactions described by Wilf is bigger than
the restrictions imposed on theorizing when the old notion of
“style” is adapted to the study of human creativity and new
technologies. Handed-down practices of inquiry have profound
implications for arriving at generalizations that can satisfy the
current appetite for “new knowledge.” The problem is a well-
known and still unresolved one: anthropologists have felt the
need to expand their inquiries to contexts that do not easily
fit the mold of analytical concepts and methods originally de-
signed to study small-scale societies. Calling for an “anthro-
pology of the contemporary,” as some of our colleagues have
done (e.g., Rabinow 2008; Rabinow and Marcus 2008), opens
a space for self-reflection but does not solve the problem of
keeping up with our times, which are defined by technologies
more complex than ever before and an unprecedented abun-
dance of material culture (including all kinds of “gadgets”) in
our everyday life that overwhelm individuals and families (e.g.,
Arnold et al. 2012). The main problem in anthropology—with
exception made for archaeologists who usually work in
teams—is the assumption that an individual researcher can
capture the complexity of contemporary life, whether at
home, in the workplace, in the classroom, at large public
events (e.g., sports matches), or on the Internet. I see the
limitations of old theoretical notions, including the notion of
“style” discussed by Wilf, as a minor problem compared with
the problem of a scientific practice that is an impediment to
deeper understanding of social change in the contemporary
world. We have known for a long time that naked-eye ob-
servational techniques are not adept at documenting fast and
complex multiparty interaction among human and nonhu-
man agents whose practical and algorithmic logic are much
harder to capture than the type of human interaction that
Boas, his students, and his students’ students abstracted from
to write ethnographies and grammars or theorize about cul-
ture and social systems. We need methods that allow us to
synchronize and compare the recording of what humans are
doing with what the computer (or any other tool-machine)
is processing and executing (e.g., Goodwin and Goodwin
1996; Hutchins 1995), including the actions of a robot like
Syrus described by Wilf. We need to integrate the best re-
cording technologies with the constantly expanding treasure
of digital data available to libraries and private citizens. Tech-
nology, of course, cannot replace thinking and theorizing—
for one thing, we need to remind ourselves that computers
and the robots that they control are always only part of the
interactions going on and there is no perfect reproduction of
what “really” happened—so we need to avoid the fallacy of
being a “virtual-realist” or a “hypercontextualist” (Duranti
2006). But an understanding of new technologies can moti-
vate collaborations that go beyond the traditional interpre-
tation of interdisciplinarity. Anthropologists are, by definition,
interdisciplinary, but we are not yet collaborative enough
across our own subfields and across divisions within the same
university. There are of course exceptions, such as the col-
laboration among archaeologists, linguists, medical anthro-
pologists, and clinical psychologists in the study of the ev-
eryday life of middle-class families supported by the Alfred
P. Sloan Foundation (e.g., Ochs and Kremer-Sadlik 2013), or
the study of trends in burglaries done by an archaeologist, a
mathematician, a statistician, and a criminologist (Mohler et
al. 2011). The laboratory studied by Wilf is a perfect example
of an interactional domain between humans and machines
where collaboration is needed if our goal is an anthropolog-
ically-informed study of human creativity.
Patrick Eisenlohr
Centre for Modern Indian Studies, University of Go¨ttingen, Wald-
weg 26, 37073 Go¨ttingen, Germany (peisenl@uni-goettingen.de).
22 IV 13
In this stimulating paper Eitan Wilf invites us to rethink
deeply held assumptions on culture and creativity against the
background of the increasing prevalence of uses of digital
technology that enable new forms of combining cultural
styles. Wilf stresses how the deployment of such new media
technologies introduces important differences in scale and
range as far as the production and combination of cultural
styles is concerned. His argument in favor of a cultural analysis
of “styles of styling styles” thus pushes up older discussions
of cultural change and reproduction one meta level. As the
speed and mutability of cultural transformation significantly
increases, Wilf acknowledges that nonhuman agents, such as
algorithms, also impose new constraints on styles. While the
skilled use of computerized algorithms can enable a spectrum
of cultural innovation and recombination that in its speed
and range typically far exceeds the capabilities of human ac-
tors, the problem of style as coherent, consistent choice re-
mains. The role that computerized algorithms seem to play
in constituting “styles of styling styles” in Wilf ’s account is
therefore an extension of a faculty that Wilf acknowledges
has always been there (the styling of styles). This appears to
bring in McLuhan’s well-known perspective on media as ex-
tensions of human actors (McLuhan 1964), and it seems to
be directed against any of the utopian or dystopian visions
of nonhuman media as overriding and dominating human
agency that have repeatedly appeared in media theory (e.g.,
de Kerckhove 1995; Kittler 1997; Virilio 1998). In my view,
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these implications of Wilf ’s analysis could be further elabo-
rated, and in this spirit my comments will focus on two issues
the insightful essay raises, the problem of style and typification
and the issue of sound reproduction and the auditory field.
At first computerized algorithms might resemble an au-
tomated Heideggerianism, as they seem to embody technology
as poetic techne¯, creating the factual, prehermeneutic presence
of things in the world (Heidegger 1977:13). But Wilf ’s eth-
nography shows us that, even though the automated styling
of styles might result in singular, new cultural phenomena,
its outcome is still subject to cultural typification. When one
of his interlocutors remarked “Syrus Music!” while listening
to his colleague trying to approximate the humanoid robot’s
ways of producing music, it is clear that we are witnessing a
moment when singular tokens resulting from the new com-
bination of existing musical styles are subsumed under a new
semiotic type, here identified as a new style particular to Syrus,
the robot. In other words, also for the computer-generated
automated styling of styles described in the paper, the dia-
lectics of token and type seem to be inescapable, because
human actors continue to synthesize sameness out of pure
difference. Styles of styling styles are not just constrained by
the material infrastructure of the technology employed, but
human acts of typification also constantly impose limits on
them. In this respect there appears to be little difference be-
tween automated and nonautomated modes of styling styles.
Further, as far as uses of sound reproduction technology
are concerned, it is also important to note that robot-gen-
erated musical styles are still mediated by the constantly shift-
ing and unique auditory fields that listeners inhabit (Ihde
2007). This includes not just the apparatus of sound repro-
duction with its reassembling of acoustic signals and the var-
iable co-presence of other sounds. Very importantly, it also
involves the bodily positioning and emplacement of listeners
(Feld 1996), their physical surroundings, and their listening
habits, that is, embodied auditory dispositions that may result
in listeners being especially receptive to particular aspects of
acoustic phenomena over others, all informed by “hearing
cultures” (Erlmann 2004). This of course also includes the
relating of a singular acoustic event, or aspects thereof to
learned semiotic types such as the “same” song, musical piece,
or overall musical style. In other words, the automated gen-
eration of musical styles unfolds in singular auditory fields,
where human listeners engage in acts of recombination and
creativity that do not primarily depend on whether the styling
of musical styles is performed by computerized algorithms or
not. This key dimension of sonic cultural creativity and re-
production seems to be largely untouched by the question of
computer-mediated algorithmic forms of sociality. Auditory
fields are in general extremely context-bound, resisting perfect
repetition, and constantly generate difference in open-ended
ways, regardless of the modes of styling styles and the technical
infrastructures of sound reproduction employed.
Ilana Gershon
Department of Communication and Culture, Indiana University,
Bloomington, 800 East Third Street, Bloomington, Indiana 47405,
U.S.A. (igershon@indiana.edu). 29 IV 13
Eitan Wilf ’s article focuses on how new technologies alter
familiar creative practices, in this case performing jazz music.
Computerized algorithms provide computer scientists in a lab
in Austin, Texas, with the opportunity to imagine anew what
constitutes improvisation and style in jazz and other musical
genres. Wilf argues that this reimagination is itself part pas-
tiche, but upon long-standing Romanticist assumptions about
creativity and culture that can be profitably put into dialogue
with American anthropological conceptions of “culture as
style” found in the writings of Boas, Benedict, and later in
Geertz. By bringing together jazz-playing computer scientists
and culture-uncovering anthropologists, Wilf hints at a po-
tentially productive approach to the social theorists who are
anthropologists’ ancestors: asking how their theoretical ap-
proaches were shaped by tacit semiotic ideologies based on
contemporaneous technologies.
This is a question that our contemporary media ecologies
encourage. All these technologies can alter the ways in which
we circulate knowledge, aesthetic forms, and value. These are
not always large changes, but even the small transformations
to practices of circulation can reveal tacit assumptions of
earlier theorists. For example, what can digital money reveal
about Marx’s assumptions about money’s materiality (see
Maurer 2011)? In Wilf ’s case, when computer scientists are
able to turn jazz musicians’ styles into measurable units that
can then be combined proportionally (that is, 20% of Miles
Davis, 20% of Charlie Parker), this changes how one can
mobilize style. In the process, it sheds light on Boas’s and
others’ assumptions about creative choices and cultural re-
straints. Wilf shows scholars a line of inquiry to classic social
theory that promises to be very productive, revealing what
has been taken for granted by asking, for example, how Ben-
edict Anderson’s or Gabriel Tarde’s theories might have to
change when the ur-media for circulating public information
is no longer newspapers and pamphlets but the Internet. Yet
Wilf is a bit hesitant about which direction the contrast cuts:
Is it Boas and Benedict that can be understood in the new
light shed by computerized algorithms or can Boas and Ben-
edict be transformed with a bit of imaginative care to explain
these computer scientists’ semiotic ideologies about creativity
and music? I am suggesting it might be time to reexamine
anthropological ancestors by comparing their own media
ecologies with our own. In his article Wilf seems more am-
bivalent, or perhaps more versatile, about the direction this
reexamination could take.
This analytical move, however, requires careful attention
to a range of semiotic ideologies that should be historically
situated. What are the computer scientists’ semiotic ideologies
of music and computers? Is there a difference for the com-
puter scientists between adding 20% of Charlie Parker to the
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“Yardbird Suite” or 20% of a jazz style to Beethoven’s “Moon-
light Sonata”? How does thinking about music through this
particular algorithmic lens change people’s relationships to
music—what happens in practice when music is a “product
of combinatorics”? And how do the computer scientists’ ide-
ologies about style, genre, and music in general compare to
the social theorists’ semiotic ideologies that Wilf puts the
scientists into dialogue with?
This is a comparative project, yet I want to suggest it is a
comparison of more than culturally and historically specific
media ecologies and ideologies. Style in music, after all, is
different than style in pottery in many cultural contexts. In
Wilf ’s examples, how people understand authorship in dif-
ferent media contributes to this difference. But music’s and
pottery’s material forms are also part of this difference—some
forms are more amenable to being computerized, or might
seem to be more worthwhile in remastered form from some
computer scientists’ perspective. How much does the em-
phasis on the “styles of styling styles” depend on music’s
specificity as an aesthetic form and its amenability to com-
puterize algorithms? How much can one generalize? As com-
puterized algorithms increasingly shape how knowledge cir-
culates and art is produced, will forms less amenable to this
manipulation develop different statuses—either more easily
overlooked or more privileged? Here questions of materiality
and semiotic ideologies intersect to allow scholars to reflect
on the complex dialectic relationship between technological
innovation and social change.
Wilf is asking whether what counts as spontaneous and
reactive changes when computer-mediated algorithms are the
techniques people use to express creativity. That is, he asks
whether familiar anthropological questions about agency and
structure or individuality and cultural restraint are restated
with a “difference which makes a difference” (Bateson 1972:
272) when improvisation is a result of proportioning styles.
In doing so, he points to the possibility that familiar older
anthropological theories have assumptions about channels
and circulation embedded within them that cannot be applied
seamlessly and without repair to contemporary mediated
practices. Everyday uses of computerized algorithms might
be making it necessary to uncover the implicit assumptions
about media and technology in social theories that Bauman
and Briggs uncovered about language in Voices of Modernity
(2003).
Adrian Mackenzie
Sociology, Lancaster University, Bailrigg, LA14YL, United Kingdom
(a.mackenzie@lancaster.ac.uk). 13 V 13
In the social science and humanities literature on algorithms,
style has not been the focus of interest. Algorithms exemplify
intangible processes in various domains of business, govern-
ment, media, entertainment, and infrastructure. While ques-
tions of power, agency, materiality, and relationality have been
widely discussed in relation to algorithms, algorithmic aes-
thetics have been less prominent.
While Eitan Wilf aims to explore what algorithms mean for
the underpinning notions of culture in anthropology (and other
disciplines), my commentary mainly concerns the handling of
algorithms as objects of analysis. Wilf connects algorithms and
style through an ethnographic study of a jazz-playing robot.
Studying algorithms through music, even improvised music
such as jazz, immediately connects algorithms to aesthetic ex-
perience and hence style. The history of music, perhaps more
so than other arts, is replete with instances of algorithms and
quasi-algorithmic processes. Whether in the rhythms of Afro-
Cuban music, the structure of Baroque counterpoint, or twen-
tieth-century Serialism, algorithms, mathematics, and music
have been entangled. In this respect, the case that Wilf de-
scribes—Syrus, a marimba-playing robot, controlled by a sta-
tistical machine learning or artificial intelligence model—is
hardly unusual. Even Syrus’s capacity to combine styles of im-
provisation, or “styling styles,” is not necessarily very unex-
pected. Recursive combination is a familiar move in algorithmic
processes.
And yet to present, as Wilf does, Syrus as symptomatic of
wider transformations in contemporary sociality associated
with algorithms is perhaps more provocative and problematic.
Whereas music is felt very immediately, experiences of al-
gorithms in other settings are highly mediated. When we
think, insofar as we can, of the algorithms at work in con-
temporary digital media (Facebook, Youtube, ebay, Twitter,
etc.), aesthetic experience is not the category that comes first
to mind. What does come to mind? Very little in fact. This
is not to say we cannot know how the algorithms work. While
the exact algorithmic processes are not public knowledge, the
general algorithmic treatment of these data can be imputed.
The algorithms are nothing particularly new. At a general
level, they have been described in high-profile publications
such as formed *Wired* magazine editor Kevin Anderson’s
“The End of Theory” (Anderson 2008). They are taught in
any number of online courses (see, e.g., Stanford University’s
Andrew Ng’s cs229 course on [machine learning] (http://www
.youtube.com/playlist?listpPLJ_CMbwA6bT-n1W0mgOlY
wccZ-j6gBXqE).
Two observations arise from this patent yet unfelt character
of algorithms. First, algorithms could be read by cultural an-
alysts in terms of style. The algorithms comprise a patchwork
of different techniques and approaches to data. Algorithms
are not stylistically consistent, and they exhibit diverse prov-
enances, even if they are increasingly “standardized” in the
form of software libraries and platforms. The fact that these
algorithms are applied to personal and group behaviors in
order to classify or predict actions and to leverage advertising
or sales on the basis of machine learning should not lead us
to flatten the many differences between them. Like the robot
arms, which, as Wilf describes, impose certain stylistic con-
straints on Syrus’s playing, every algorithm brings with it
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certain material-technical constraints that effectively style it.
Similarly, every algorithm, and particularly the quite convo-
luted machine-learning algorithms used in social media, car-
ries inherited latent conceptions of relation, number, move-
ment, order, and event. In short, there is no purely algorithmic
style, since algorithms themselves are styled. This means that
the styling of style still has style, and the questions of coher-
ence or integration that ran through anthropological and so-
cial science invocations of style more broadly might be re-
invoked.
Wilf ’s comparison between Syrus and the increasingly en-
compassing worlds of machine-learning algorithms raises
questions of scales (as in size). Syrus’s data include numerous
previous jazz performances and the data generated by its hu-
man players. The musical data base may be large, but com-
pared to the accumulations of data wielded by finance, social
media, many contemporary sciences, or businesses like Wal-
mart or Amazon, it is likely to be small. The problem with
the massive success of machine-learning algorithms is that
their integrative scope threatens to subsume all others. This
point would take some developing, but say we revisit, as Wilf
does, Pierre Bourdieu’s integrative concept of habitus. For
Bourdieu, habitus integrates experiences “statistically com-
mon” to members of the same class. What happens when
algorithms, making no assumptions about membership, class,
or personhood, work out what is “statistically common” and
remake the world in that style? What happens to habitus
under such regimes of integration? On a large scale, algo-
rithms performatively redistribute what is statistically com-
mon and thereby undercut the differences on which habitus
or forms of life thrive. The irony of Syrus, in this context, is
that its engineers and computer scientists pursue precisely the
opposite: from the algorithms they hope to hear something
uncommon. It would be interesting to know whether they
can hear that in Syrus’s playing, and if they can, to think
what that would mean for our understandings of how cultural
invention and change happens.
Thomas M. Malaby
Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee,
P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201, U.S.A. (malaby@uwm
.edu). 22 IV 13
Eitan Wilf ’s article presents the potent example of Syrus, an
interactive robotic musician with whom fellow musicians can
have an open-ended, and ideally inspirational, relationship.
In contrast to the Boolean, determinate relationship that char-
acterized our engagement with digital technology over much
of its history (think ATMs or TurboTax, where the only source
of contingency is user choice), Syrus behaves more like a
computer-controlled agent (opponent or collaborator) in a
digital game. Similarly, the lab in which we find Syrus is a
contrived, yet open-ended, game-like space, where the meet-
ing of technology and human action have both a speedy,
phenomenologically rich, and open-ended dimension (in the
playing of music) and a reflective, symbolically mediated, and
more determinate dimension (in the setting up of Syrus and
his parameters between such playing).
For Wilf, this constitutes a demonstration of the limits of
one strand of our thinking about culture. We must confront,
he argues, how we have conceived of our embodied, culturally
shaped dispositions as (a) inaccessible (because implicit, em-
bodied, and the like) and (b) constrained by the broader
parameters characteristic of a particular cultural style, both
of which get in the way of understanding experiences such
as those possible with Syrus. Wilf further shows how this view
of culture as “style” is a mutual construction between art (and
creative expression more broadly) and culture undergirding
much of our disciplinary thought, ultimately traceable back
to German Romanticism.
There is no doubt that in several respects anthropology
must continue diligently at least to recognize and adjust, if
not transform, our concepts, which bear the deep imprint of
years spent under the weight of a notion of culture as
bounded. One wonders, however, whether the case is perhaps
overdrawn through its exclusion of other threads, especially
those leading back to Gluckman and the study of conflict
within cultural contexts. Could the links to him by many
anthropologists who pursued another metaphor of artistic
expression, theater, be part of the reason they are not pre-
sented herein? Importantly, though in a footnote, Wilf briefly
suggests that dramaturgically-inspired (Goffman) and other
approaches (largely in the area of linguistic performance) do
not suffice to change the story: “Specifically, these approaches
do not capture the facility, enhanced control, and heightened
conscious agency that are entailed in style mixing via com-
puterized algorithms.” I would completely agree, but of course
at this point we are quite a distance away from Wilf ’s broader
claim that anthropology’s approach to culture as style has
inhibited our ability to recognize how actors can innovate
beyond the constraints of a particular cultural system at all.
And so one fears that Wilf ’s subtler and, to me, more in-
teresting point might get lost amid the extensive discussion of
the shortcomings of our disciplinary heritage. As Wilf puts it
(again in that footnote), “The style-manipulation I am con-
cerned with is subject to heightened conscious control and
reflection precisely because ‘the calculation’ is performed by
nonhuman agents, i.e., computerized algorithms, on behalf of
human agents. This frees the latter to be much more consciously
agentive with their manipulation of styles.” The claim here is
that digital technology—in its near instantaneity, its network-
able structure, and the symbolic manipulability of its code—
transforms the speed, scale, and scope of social action, but just
as importantly opens up new opportunities for moving back
and forth along the spectrum between social action that is
urgent and that which is reflective. Or, one might add, it opens
up new opportunities for divvying up access to those forms of
engagement between those who can tinker “under the hood,”
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as computer programmers often say, and those invited only to
act within this complex, open-ended, and interactive system.
Such would seem to characterize an increasingly apparent social
division between platform engineers (often outside of avenues
of appeal) and users (despite their elevation as agents—the
“crowd”—in much technoliberal rhetoric).
Human action has always taken place within domains that
have run the gamut from more to less contrived, from more
routinized to more open-ended, but for the most part it has
been in somewhat limited ways that architects and other re-
flective and intentional designers of our experience could tin-
ker with the transformations in style prompted by new de-
signed spaces or other experiences. Furthermore, much of
those projects of contrivance have been about control in the
high modernist sense—about the elimination, or at least min-
imization, of contingency in the service of bureaucratic in-
stitutions. Now, however, the rapprochement between digital
technology’s Boolean, determinate materiality and the con-
trived contingencies of game design (including, but beyond,
the stochastic) and similar techniques has enabled new kinds
of styles of styling styles, as Wilf makes clear, and he is correct
that our anthropology must tackle the new avenues to ma-
nipulation, even of our dispositions, that present technology
affords.
Nick Seaver and Tom Boellstorff
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Irvine,
3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, California 92697-5100; U.S.A.
(nseaver@uci.edu). 16 IV 13
We thank Eitan Wilf for a provocative essay integrating strong
data with careful attention to the history of explanatory par-
adigms in anthropology. We like his style and are fascinated
by the harmonies he has composed from a diverse range of
ethnographic and theoretical materials. In this spirit, our
comment takes the form of a conceptual improvisation, 50%
Boellstorff and 50% Seaver, playing in the key of Wilf.
A central theme of Wilf ’s argument is style, and as he
proceeds from marimba-playing robots to Facebook to the
Romantic roots of anthropology’s long obsession with style,
he traces out variations on this theme. “Style” is dauntingly
polysemous; as Wilf notes, it has been mobilized in many
ways throughout the history of anthropology. Wilf produc-
tively links these notions of style from anthropology, music,
and algorithms. To build on Wilf ’s analysis, we might further
address disjunctures between these conceptions of “style” and
to how styles themselves are produced as objects of inquiry.
Although we may call them “styles,” the statistical patterns
of user behavior identified by Facebook, the cultural congru-
ences identified by Boas, Kroeber, and Mead, and the Markov-
chain probabilities of Syrus invoke different, even possibly
incommensurate, notions of “style.” The fact that two or more
things are identified with the same English lexeme suggests
lines of analysis, but to say that a particular large cat and a
particular automobile are both “Jaguars” certainly obscures
more than it reveals, and the same issue can crop up with
differing notions of “style.” If we cast the analysis in terms
not so reliant on the multiple meanings of English “style,”
how might the analytic shift as well?
Wilf ’s argument for analyzing sociality “through the prism
of styles of styling styles” suggests a potentially infinite hi-
erarchy of “styling styles” alongside the more familiar notion
of personal “style.” How might further attention to nonhier-
archical or lateral relationships among styles provide another
perspective on emergent forms of algorithmic living? In ad-
dition to thinking of algorithmic styles as successively nested
explanatory frames or mixtures of individual distinctions, we
might investigate other computational figurations of style.
Such an investigation could draw on alternative analyses of
style, for instance, ones that foreground temporality and
change (e.g., White 1978). This might serve as a counterpoint
to the tendency that Wilf notes in the history of anthropology
to see styles as “patterns” of holistic cultures, given that many
theories of culture (e.g., structuralism and functionalism)
have had difficulty accounting for change over time.
Wilf ’s attention to the history of anthropology can be com-
plemented by an attention to the history of technology and
style. Drawing on this history can help us understand what
precisely is new and at stake in these developments. For in-
stance, although human expressive style and machinery have
often been opposed, Wilf ’s article provides a rich example of
the entanglement of expression and technology. During an
earlier generation of musical robots—specifically, the player
piano—debates also focused on the possibilities of capturing
style in a machine. High-end “reproducing pianos” could
recreate subtle variations in tempo and loudness in recordings
made by famous pianists. As a result, discourse around the
player piano construed tempo and dynamic variation as the
essence of style (Seaver 2011). Users of these pianos could take
control themselves, layering their own expression over that re-
corded on the piano roll by manipulating levers and pedals.
This represents a kind of stylistic mixing quite different from
what we see in Syrus’s improvisations. This history leads us to
ask, are algorithmic forms of sociality limited to those predi-
cated on computer mediation? What might we gain from think-
ing through the algorithmic manipulation of style as a variation
on an old theme: the intimate and evolving connection between
what we think of as human and what we think of as technical?
Which brings us to algorithms. An important issue for
further consideration is in what ways an “algorithmic turn”
is shaping new ways of being human, and in what ways it
is revealing and concretizing aspects of sociality that were
there all along. The kind of slider sociality Wilf identifies in
his ethnographic data raises important issues about inten-
tionality and emergence, of ossification but also customiza-
tion—affordances as well as constraints. Further exploration
of variation and debate in the broader community of Wilf ’s
researcher interlocutors might provide interesting perspectives
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on articulations of performance, technology, and style. What
might other algorithmic configurations afford? How would
other forms of “computer mediation” (e.g., ones not based
on Markov Models) alter what “style” and “mixing” might
entail?
We hope our riff on these promising lines of inquiry dem-
onstrates how Wilf ’s article provides a timely and valuable
consideration of notions of style from anthropology, music,
and contemporary digital culture. Given the growing perva-
siveness of algorithms in everyday life, this is a valuable con-
tribution indeed.
Reply
My article is about computer-mediated, algorithmic tech-
nologies that are able to abstract a type (e.g., style) from a
corpus of tokens (e.g., specific solos of the same improviser)
and thus produce new tokens of this type (e.g., new solos in
“the same style”) and also enable users to manipulate the
constraints that structure such types so as to produce tokens
of new types. Style thus becomes much more amenable to
conscious manipulation, at the same time that this manip-
ulation is itself constrained and hence styled due to the nature
of different algorithms, hardware, and cultural frameworks.
To account for such technologies we must return to a key
tradition of anthropological theory of theorizing culture as
style, but not before we reconfigure this tradition in light of
such technologies.
The theoretical added value of the distinction between to-
kens and types is exemplified in Eisenlohr’s comments. He
correctly points out that the dialectics of token and type seem
to be inescapable, that is, that at the end of the day, even the
new styles created by Syrus must undergo typification by its
human listeners. Elsewhere (Wilf 2013a) I have discussed in
detail the ways in which humans, when interacting with such
technologies, actively fill in the blank spaces in the output
generated by such technologies, thus synthesizing a type from
what sometimes appears to be pure difference. This persistent
typification by humans notwithstanding, we should not re-
main blind to the fact that my focus has been technologies
capable of automated typification. This makes them radically
different from the technologies Eisenlohr has studied, such
as CDs, MP3 files, and cassettes. To frame it in a Peircean
terminology closer to Eisenlohr’s theoretical predilections,
whereas he studied technologies that reproduce Seconds,
Syrus is a technology that reproduces Thirds. Eisenlohr’s po-
sition might result in the argument that because humans typ-
ify any kind of data they encounter then the nature of the
data becomes irrelevant. While such a position makes us sen-
sitive to the continuities of past and present (typification by
humans is inevitable), it leaves us myopic to the particularities
of the present with respect to the past (some technologies are
able to typify).
Understanding these technologies as technologies that can
synthesize types from a corpus of tokens and hence produce
new tokens in the same style or type is crucial if we want to
account for their potential impact in the sphere of online
consumption. Here Bourdieu’s notion of habitus—itself a
type (“disposition”) responsible for the production of tokens
(behavior) in the same style—becomes important. Mackenzie
is correct to suggest that if we take algorithmic technologies
that make “no assumptions about membership, class, or per-
sonhood,” then they “performatively redistribute what is sta-
tistically common” such as habitus. Yet this is not the only
kind of algorithmic technologies in which a lot of R&D funds
are currently being invested. For example, as some of the
same “high-profile publications” mentioned by Mackenzie
make it clear, companies, aided by such technologies, now
increasingly experiment with assigning different prices to the
same product according to assumptions they make about the
socioeconomic class of specific online customers as algorith-
mically inferred from customers’ online behavior (Valentino-
Devries, Singer-Vine, and Soltani 2012). Much of the con-
temporary commercial interest in algorithmic technologies is
related to their hypothesized, albeit not yet fully realized,
potential to classify consumers precisely according to the hab-
itus-determining factors Bourdieu theorized. Although al-
gorithmic processes in general are indeed nothing new—a
cake recipe is an algorithm and, as I have noted in my article,
Markov models have been used in algorithmic music com-
position since the 1950s—their contemporary computerized
iterations certainly are new, especially the expanding com-
mercialization of automatic synthesizing of types (styles) from
tokens.
Such iterations, in turn, explain why certain threads in an-
thropological theory are more suitable than others as frames
of analysis of such technologies. Hence the answer to the ques-
tion posited by Malaby, namely, why I did not discuss the
analytical thread leading back to Max Gluckman and the study
of conflict within cultural contexts, as well as the many an-
thropologists who pursued another metaphor of artistic ex-
pression, theater, is quite simple: this thread frames change as
unanticipated “social dramas,” and it frames agentive control
in terms of individuals’ recourse to highly conventionalized
rituals, behaviors, and roles as their strategy of resolving such
dramas (Gluckman 1958). Such an approach is the precise
negative image of the ethnographic context I studied, where
change is the product of agentive control enabled via the ma-
nipulation of constraints and where the purpose of such agen-
tive control is to stylize new behaviors, not to perpetuate highly
conventionalized ones. Finally, if we take one of Gluckman’s
most celebrated students who used the metaphor of theater,
Victor Turner, we indeed find a theory about the existence of
a social space in which society members have the capacity to
step outside of, reflect on, and sometimes reconfigure taken-
for-granted social norms (and hence style new styles), yet we
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also find Turner famously theorizing this aspect of social life
in terms of the “liminal” and “betwixt and between,” that is,
as a transitory phase leading to, rather than a phase that is part
of, routinized reality and behavior (see Wilf 2012:32). In con-
trast, the manipulation of constraints and the stylizing of styles
I analyze are intended to take the form of a mundane and quite
routinized aspect of the social, available to anyone with access
to the appropriate technologies.
With Malaby’s second point, however, I must agree, namely,
that these technologies entail a social division between people
who have the skills to design such technologies or to “tinker
under the hood” and people who will have to use these tech-
nologies as is, accepting the constraints designed and manip-
ulated by others and thus the styles of styling styles as stylized
by such experts. This social division is effectively discussed
by Cheney-Lippold, too, who urges us to analyze these al-
gorithmic technologies as technologies that force their users
to “speak on another’s terms.” That being said, I would cau-
tion against assuming a dichotomy between a state of “im-
mediation” in which we encounter Coltrane “on an individual
level” and a state of mediation that presents us with Coltrane’s
standardized shadow, as Cheney-Lippold seems to do.
At stake, as Gershon aptly puts it, are also our semiotic and
media ideologies that intervene whether we listen to Coltrane
in a “live” setting (itself a highly mediated state) or as simulated
by style-reproducing algorithms. I could not have formulated
the future research avenues opened up by my article any better
than Gershon, who also correctly points out that we need to
understand the ways in which practices of styling styles aided
by computerized algorithms are structured by the nature of the
artistic medium at stake—music, the plastic arts, poetry, and
so forth—and the specific materiality of its semiotic forms (see
Wilf [2012:38] for this difference with respect to technologies
that reproduce tokens rather than types).
As Gershon accurately adds, my article is about a new kind
of infrastructure and the possibilities and limitations of which
it is productive. Hence the relevance of the very interesting
point made by Duranti with which I could not have agreed
more: anthropologists have tended to pursue their research
individually, embodying the romantic image described so well
by Susan Sontag as “the anthropologist as hero” (Sontag 1961);
an anthropology of the contemporary moment, however, re-
quires a more collaborative approach. Surprisingly, however,
Duranti stops short at this description of our contemporary
style of doing anthropology instead of digging deeper at the
source and nature of the constraints responsible for this style:
the very academic infrastructure of the humanistic social sci-
ences. For, as any academic knows too well, resistance to “mix-
ing styles”—that is, to academic collaboration—has been largely
motivated by the concern of tenure and promotion committees
to maintain “purity of individual style” so they could presum-
ably better assess the scholarly worth of individual academics
(O’Hara and Kaag 2013). As the current dean of social sciences
at University of California, Los Angeles, then, it is up to people
at Duranti’s administrative position to change the constraints
responsible for our current academic style. In the absence of
such change, an increase in the number of major collaborative
projects is unlikely to happen.
And so, at last, we arrive at the collaboratively generous
response provided by Seaver and Boellstorff. They raise a host
of smart questions and articulate promising avenues of research.
First and foremost, they suggest that I have encompassed too
much variety under the notion of style. To begin, I want to
emphasize that I have focused on only one kind of algorithms,
Markov processes, and that these algorithms are one of the key
building blocks of the algorithmic customization architecture
of companies such as Google and Facebook. Consider one of
Google’s numerous patents, entitled “user-based advertisement
positioning using markov models,” which is concerned with
“methods and systems to modify the number and/or position-
ing of advertisements presented to a user based on that user’s
activity patterns (e.g., previous queries, query result selections,
ad selections, etc.” [US patent 8,271,328 B1]). There is a direct
line between the technologies that animate Syrus and such
commercial applications, and we need to figure out which an-
thropological theories might be relevant to their analysis. An-
thropological theories of culture as style are such theories.
Second, willingness to take seriously different iterations of
the notion of style, however remote from one another they
might seem to be at first glance, aligns with one of anthro-
pology’s most valuable methodological principles. Hence it
was surprising to note that Seaver and Boellstorff dismiss as
uninformative a claim such as “a particular large cat and a
particular automobile are both ‘Jaguars,’” for precisely such
claims have been at the core of a specific social institution of
some importance in the history of anthropology: totemism.
Ironically, some anthropologists have taken such claims se-
riously and thereby been able to suggest that “‘the totemic
operator,’ articulating differences in the cultural series to dif-
ferences in natural species . . . has . . . been replaced [today]
by species and varieties of manufactured objects, which like
totemic categories” support social classification in the sphere
of consumer lifestyle (Sahlins 1976:176, emphasis added; see
also Roland Barthes’s Mythologies [1957:74], especially his
wonderful “La Nouvelle Citroe¨n” [1957:150–152]—not quite
the mighty Jaguar, to be sure, but a fine car nonetheless!—
for an analysis of the totemic classificatory logic of style that
consists of precisely such claims, also brilliantly elucidated in
Bourdieu’s Distinction [1984]).
Seaver and Boellstorff correctly argue that any approach to
the study of computer-mediated, algorithmic forms of soci-
ality must take into account the history of technology and
style. Turning to this history, then, I want to reiterate not
only what is novel about the computerized algorithms I have
studied but also the ways in which anthropologists might miss
this novelty by not carefully attending to what style actually
is. Consider the reenacting piano, discussed by Seaver and
Boellstorff, to which, incidentally, I have referred elsewhere
(Wilf 2013a). Contrary to what their comments suggest, such
pianos did not reproduce style. They were based in the prin-
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ciple of “mechanical fidelity” (otherwise effectively analyzed
by Seaver), not “stylistic fidelity.” What does this difference
entail? I will reiterate a point I have already made above. Such
pianos reenacted specific performances recorded by great per-
formers on a special recording piano (Seaver 2011:64–65).
The reenacting piano reenacted these performances by re-
producing their qualia (e.g., the intensity of each note played
by the performer during the recording). They thus reproduced
tokens rather than types. It is the human listener who ab-
stracted types (styles) by listening to these reenacted tokens
and perceiving relations between relations between one to-
ken’s parts or between a number of tokens of the same type
(Wilf 2013a). Syrus, on the other hand, as well as the various
computerized-algorithms designed to reproduce style, oper-
ates according to the principle of “stylistic fidelity”: it does
not purport to reproduce past performances of a jazz master
but rather to abstract a master’s style responsible for the gen-
eration of his stylistically consistent improvisations. The ab-
straction of a master’s style from a corpus of his past recorded
improvisations allows Syrus to produce new tokens (i.e., new
improvisations) of this type (i.e., in this style). The difference
between tokens and types has been at the foundation of the
theories of style formulated by the anthropologists I have
discussed in my article, and it is highly relevant to the tech-
nologies at stake. The risk of confusing tokens with types is
precisely why we need to take style seriously—indeed, “be-
yond the level of lexemes”—not irrespective of our desire to
map out the varieties of contemporary forms of computer-
mediated, algorithmic forms of sociality and their difference
from forms of sociality meditated by previous media tech-
nologies, but as the very condition of possibility for our ability
to do so, to begin with.
—Eitan Wilf
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